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final by statute and those final agency actions for which no other
adequate remedy exists.1 8 While application of the Act does not
substantially enlarge the petitioner's remedy, it may make it more
effective in that it is available sooner.Although this decision has already been followed, 19 there is considerable opposition to it outside of the courts; 20 nor is there any
assurance that the Supreme Court21will follow it in view of their most
recent pronouncements of policy.

B. F. N.
INSURANcE-LIFE INSURANcE-ACCIDENTAL DEATH BENEFITS
-MILITARY
SERVICE EXEMPTION CLAUSE.-The court was called

upon to construe the meaning of a clause exempting the insurance
company from paying double indemnity while the insured is in military service. The defendant insurance company had issued on August 3, 1936, two policies of life insurance, each for $500, on William
Jorgenson. The plaintiff, his wife, was named beneficiary. Each
policy contained a provision to the effect that if the insured died as a
result of an accident double indemnity would be paid. Each policy
also contained the provision, "No Accidental Death Benefit will be
paid if the death of the Insured is the result of self-destruction ...
or while the Insured is in military or naval service in time of war."
On October 18, 1944, the insured, a member of the U. S. Army, was
on duty at Bangolore, India. While on town patrol the motorcycle
on which he was riding became involved in an accident, and the insured suffered a fractured skull from which he later died. The beneficiary submitted proof-of-death and a claim for $1,000 under each
policy. The company paid $500 on each policy, refusing to pay the
additional $500 for accidental death on the ground that the insured
i860 STAT. 243, 5 U. S. C. § 1009c (1946), provides: "Acts reviewable.
Every agency action made final by statute and every final agency action for
which there is no other adequate remedy in any court, shall be subject to judicial review. .. "
"IUnited States ex reL. Cammarata v. Miller, 79 F. Supp. 643 (S. D. N. Y.
1948).
20 The Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization has steadfastly insisted that the Act does not apply to his agency, 8 I. & N. S. Monthly Review
105 (1947); and a bill was submitted to the 80th Congress to make the
Act inapplicable to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. H. R. 6333
(Hobbs 1948).
21 Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., - U.. S.
92 L. ed. 367, 369 (1948). "This court has long held that statutes which
employ broad terms to confer power of judicial review are not always to be
read literally. Where Congress has authorized review of 'any order' or used
other equally inclusive terms, courts have declined the opportunity to magnify
their jurisdiction, by self-denying constructions which do not subject to judicial
control orders which, from their nature, from the context of the Act, or from
the relation of judicial power to the subject-matter, are inappropriate for
review."
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was not covered since he was a member of the armed forces in time
of war. In an action to recover the additional $500, the Court of
Common Pleas rendered judgment for defendant. Appeal was made
to this court. Held, judgment affirmed. Jorgenson v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co., - N. J. -, 55 A. 2d 2 (1947).
In construing military exemption clauses the courts have come
to conflicting opinions.' The question in each case has been whether
the provision contemplates merely the status of military service as
the basis for relieving the insurer from liability,2 or whether it must
appear that in addition to the status the death occurred as a result
of military activities.3 The courts have agreed, however, that the
wording of the provision is of primary importance in determining the
intent of the parties.
Where the provision has read "engaged," 4 "in consequence of"
or "as a result of such service" 6 the courts have been of the opinion
that the military status alone was not sufficient to avoid liability.
Where the provision has read "while in," 7 "while enrolled in" 8 or
a "risk" not assumed 9 the courts have been of the opinion that the
status alone was sufficient. Plaintiff contends that any ambiguity
or doubt as to the construction of the terms should be construed in
her favor and that the provision is contrary to public policy since it
is an inducement to refrain from enlistment. The court points out
there is no ambiguity in the contract, 10 no doubt as to the construction of the terms," and the provision is not contrary to public policy.
In respect to the last point, they failed to see how the provision could
be an agreement not to enlist; an attempt to evade the draft law;
or an inducement to refrain from enlisting, 12 as the plaintiff had con1 See Note, 137 A. L. R. 1263 (1942).

2 Miller v. Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n, 138 Ark. 442, 212 S. W. 310
(1919) ; Huntington v. Fraternal Reserve Ass'n, 173 Wis. 582, 181 N. W. 819
(1921).
3 Gorder v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 46 N. D. 192, 180 N. W. 514

(1920) ; Malone v. State Life Ins. Co., 202 Mo. App. 499, 213 S.W. 877 (1919).
4N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Durham, '166 F. 2d 874 (C. C. A. 10th 1948);

Railey v. United Life & Accident Ins. Co., 26 Ga. App. 269, 106 S. E. 203
(1921).
5 Gorder v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., supra note 3.
-6Malone v. State Life Ins. Co., supra note 3.
7Huntington v. Fraternal Reserve Ass'n, supra note 2. Contra: Young v.
Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 204 S. C. 386, 29 S. E. 2d 482 (1944).
8 White v. Standard Life Ins. Co., 198 Miss. 325, 22 So. 2d 353 (1945).
1 Miller v. Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n, supra note 2.
10 "The latent ambiguity found by courts of other jurisdictions in construing military service exemption clauses is not applicable here since those provisions were of different terminology." Jorgenson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
- N. J.-, 55 A. 2d 2, 4 (1947).
11 "The terms of the instant contract are clear." Ibid.
12 "We do not think the argument is well founded. An insurance company
has the right to select the particular risks it is willing to assume, and there
is no public policy against a contract of this sort exempting the insurance company in advance, from liability for death of the insured while in military or
naval service of the government. The stipulation does not provide for a for-
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tended. This viewpoint has been specifically approved in other

jurisdictions.

8

In New York the matter seems to have been settled once and
for all by statute.14 The language is quite clear and leaves little room
for doubt If the insured dies inside the United States his death must
be a result of his being a member of such service. 15 In the event the
insured dies outside such states, his military status alone is sufficient
to avoid liability.' 6
L.J.L.
INsURANcE -LIFE

INSURANCE-MATERIALITY OF MISREPREPoLIc .- This is

SENTATIONS IN APPLICATION IN NON-MEDICAL

an action on a non-medical policy of life insurance. The insured died
of a rheumatic heart condition about one year after the policy was
issued. The defense is that the insured's negative answers to questions in the application, as to whether she ever had any illness or
prior medical consultation within five years, were material misrepresentations and that had the defendant known the true facts it would
not have issued the policy. The family physician had examined the
insured on several occasions prior to the issuance of the policy and
had discovered a chronic endocarditis condition. The insurer also
proved that in its practice, it uniformly rejected applications revealing
a heart condition. The trial court submitted to the jury the question
of the insured's knowledge of her heart condition and the jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff. Held, judgment reversed. The
question of knowledge on the part of the insured concerning the condition of her health has no part in the determination of liability in
this case. Section 149 of the New York Insurance Law provides
that misrepresentations as to consultations are deemed to be misfeiture of the policy, but merely for an exemption from liability under certain
circumstances and conditions. It holds out no inducements to the assured to
refrain from enlistment in his country's service, and does not constitute, in any
sense, an agreement not to enlist or to evade the draft law." Id. at 5, the
court here adopts a quotation from Miller v. Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n.,
138 3Ark. 442, 212 S. W. 310, 311 (1919).
1 Railey v. United Life & Accident Ins. Co., 26 Ga. App. 269, 106 S. E.
203 (1921); Bradshaw v. Farmers' & Bankers' Life Ins. Co., 107 Kan. 681,
193 Pac. 332 (1920) ; Marks v. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur, 191 Ky. 385, 230
S. W. 540 (1921).
24 N. Y. INs. LAW § 155.
15 "No policy of life insurance . . . shall contain any provision which ex-

cludes or restricts liability for death caused in a certain specified manner or
occurring while the insured has a specified status, except the following provisions...

(1) Inside the forty-eight states of the United States, the District of
Columbia or the Dominion of Canada as a result of service in (a) the

military, naval or air forces of any country at war, . . ." Ibid.
16 (2) "Outside such state, district, and dominion while in such forces or

units."

Ibid.

